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Money and the Gains from Trade

  • Aleksander Berentsen

    (University of Basel)

  • Guillaume Rocheteau

    (Australian National University, Australia)

This article studies the role of money in environments where in each meeting there is a double coincidence of real wants. Traders who meet at random finance their purchases through current production, the sale of divisible money or both. It is shown that in the absence of valued money if traders have asymmetric tastes for each other's good, they produce and exchange socially inefficient quantities. With valued money, however, traders exchange efficient quantities if the asymmetry of tastes is not too large. It is shown that the gains from trade in the monetary economy are strictly greater than those in the corresponding barter economy, that the Friedman rule holds, and that the allocation of resources in the monetary economy converges to the allocation in the barter economy as the growth rate of the money supply is increased. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 44 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 263-297

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:44:y:2003:i:1:p:263-297
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