On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
This paper studies a general school choice problem with or without outside options. The Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications. We show that in problems where some students cannot credibly submit a single school as the only acceptable option, it is possible to improve upon DA without sacrificing strategyproofness. On the other hand, in unrestricted problems where no outside options necessarily exist, it is not possible to improve upon DA via a strategy-proof mechanism.
|Date of creation:||2012|
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- Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2007.
"What`s the Matter with Tie-breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice,"
Economics Series Working Papers
349, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-89, June.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006.
"Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism,"
NBER Working Papers
11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 639, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
- Aytek Erdil, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Stochastic Assignment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1333, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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