Strategy-Proof Stochastic Assignment
I study strategy-proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects. A stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments, and mechanisms are compared according to first-order stochastic dominance. I show that non-wasteful strategy-proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy-proof mechanisms, however nonwastefulness is highly restrictive when the mechanism involves randomization. In fact, the Random Priority mechanism (i.e., the Random Serial Dictatorship), and a recently adopted school choice mechanism, Deferred Acceptance with Random Tie-breaking, are wasteful. I find that both these mechanisms are dominated by strategy-proof mechanisms. In general, strategy-proof improvement cannot be due to merely reshuffling objects, and therefore must involve assigning more objects. Forthcoming in
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2006.
"Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools,"
Cahiers de recherche
2006-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2006. "Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools," Cahiers de recherche 04-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Storcken, Ton, 2014.
"Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 123-127.
- Storcken A.J.A. & Peters H.J.M. & Roy S. & Sen A., 2013. "Probabilistic Strategy-Proof Rules over Single-Peaked Domains," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Pathak, Parag A. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2011.
"Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result,"
Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
- Parag A. Pathak & Jay Sethuraman, 2010. "Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result," NBER Working Papers 16140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kojima, Fuhito & Manea, Mihai, 2010. "Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 106-123, January.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1333. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Howard Cobb)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.