IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/vfsc23/277606.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Executive Compensation and Secured Debt: Evidence from REITs

Author

Listed:
  • Li, Ying
  • Li, Lingxiao
  • Zhu, Bing

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Ying & Li, Lingxiao & Zhu, Bing, 2023. "Executive Compensation and Secured Debt: Evidence from REITs," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277606, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277606
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/277606/1/vfs-2023-pid-86431.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chen, Haosi & Maslar, David A. & Serfling, Matthew, 2020. "Asset redeployability and the choice between bank debt and public debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Cantillo, Miguel & Wright, Julian, 2000. "How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 155-189.
    3. Rampini, Adriano A. & Viswanathan, S., 2013. "Collateral and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 466-492.
    4. Mine Ertugrul & Özcan Sezer & C. Sirmans, 2008. "Financial Leverage, CEO Compensation,and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 53-80, January.
    5. Kenneth Shaw, 2012. "CEO incentives and the cost of debt," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 323-346, April.
    6. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(2), pages 345-363, June.
    7. Crocker H. Liu & Peng Liu & Zhipeng Zhang, 2019. "Real Assets, Liquidation Value and Choice of Financing," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 47(2), pages 478-508, June.
    8. Dybvig, Philip H & Zender, Jaime F, 1991. "Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 201-219.
    9. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    10. Dragana Cvijanović, 2014. "Real Estate Prices and Firm Capital Structure," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(9), pages 2690-2735.
    11. Efraim Benmelech & Nitish Kumar & Raghuram Rajan, 2020. "The Decline of Secured Debt," NBER Working Papers 26637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2007. "A lender-based theory of collateral," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 826-859, June.
    13. Boubaker, Sabri & Saffar, Walid & Sassi, Syrine, 2018. "Product market competition and debt choice," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 204-224.
    14. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1991. "Credible commitments, contract enforcement problems and banks: Intermediation as credibility assurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 605-632, June.
    15. Meyer, Margaret & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1992. "Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 9-35, Spring.
    16. Ortiz-Molina, Hernan, 2007. "Executive compensation and capital structure: The effects of convertible debt and straight debt on CEO pay," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 69-93, March.
    17. Eric R. Brisker & Wei Wang, 2017. "CEO's Inside Debt and Dynamics of Capital Structure," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 655-685, September.
    18. Michael Alderson & Naresh Bansal & Brian Betker, 2014. "Secured debt and managerial incentives," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 423-440, October.
    19. Campello, Murillo & Connolly, Robert A. & Kankanhalli, Gaurav & Steiner, Eva, 2022. "Do real estate values boost corporate borrowing? Evidence from contract-level data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 611-644.
    20. Dennis, Steven & Nandy, Debarshi & Sharpe, Lan G., 2000. "The Determinants of Contract Terms in Bank Revolving Credit Agreements," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 87-110, March.
    21. David C. Ling & Andy Naranjo & Benjamin Scheick, 2019. "Asset Location, Timing Ability and the Cross‐Section of Commercial Real Estate Returns," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 263-313, March.
    22. Chava, Sudheer & Purnanandam, Amiyatosh, 2007. "Determinants of the floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 755-786, September.
    23. Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, 2010. "Capital Structure and Debt Structure," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(12), pages 4242-4280, December.
    24. Booth, James R. & Booth, Lena Chua, 2006. "Loan Collateral Decisions and Corporate Borrowing Costs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 67-90, February.
    25. Timothy Riddiough & Eva Steiner, 2020. "Financial Flexibility and Manager–Shareholder Conflict: Evidence from REITs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 48(1), pages 200-239, March.
    26. Bhagat, Sanjai & Welch, Ivo, 1995. "Corporate research & development investments international comparisons," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 443-470, April.
    27. Menkhoff, Lukas & Neuberger, Doris & Suwanaporn, Chodechai, 2006. "Collateral-based lending in emerging markets: Evidence from Thailand," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, January.
    28. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Kanatas, George, 1985. "Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(1), pages 84-95, February.
    29. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
    30. Leming Lin, 2016. "Collateral and the Choice Between Bank Debt and Public Debt," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(1), pages 111-127, January.
    31. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    32. Yun Lou & Clemens A. Otto, 2020. "Debt Heterogeneity and Covenants," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 70-92, January.
    33. Lijing Du & Jian Huang & Bharat A. Jain, 2019. "Tournament incentives and firm credit risk: Evidence from credit default swap referenced firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(7-8), pages 913-943, July.
    34. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
    35. Erasmo Giambona & Antonio S. Mello & Timothy J. Riddiough, 2018. "Real Assets, Collateral and the Limits of Debt Capacity," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 46(4), pages 836-886, December.
    36. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    37. Paul Luk & Tianxiao Zheng, 2022. "Dynamics of Secured and Unsecured Debt Over the Business Cycle," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 44, pages 284-314, April.
    38. Ghosh, Chinmoy & Huang, Di & Nguyen, Nam H. & Phan, Hieu V., 2023. "CEO tournament incentives and corporate debt contracting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    39. John Core & Wayne Guay, 2002. "Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 613-630, June.
    40. Denis, David J. & Mihov, Vassil T., 2003. "The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 3-28, October.
    41. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    42. Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, 2007. "Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1551-1588, August.
    43. May, Don O, 1995. "Do Managerial Motives Influence Firm Risk Reduction Strategies?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1291-1308, September.
    44. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    45. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, René M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 391-405, December.
    46. Eisdorfer, Assaf & Giaccotto, Carmelo & White, Reilly, 2013. "Capital structure, executive compensation, and investment efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 549-562.
    47. James Conklin & Moussa Diop & Mingming Qiu, 2018. "How Do Firms Finance Nonprimary Market Investments? Evidence from REITs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 46(1), pages 120-159, March.
    48. Chen, Yehning, 2006. "Collateral, loan guarantees, and the lenders' incentives to resolve financial distress," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-15, February.
    49. Stulz, ReneM. & Johnson, Herb, 1985. "An analysis of secured debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 501-521, December.
    50. Paul Brockman & Xiumin Martin & Emre Unlu, 2010. "Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1123-1161, June.
    51. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 2003. "Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 71-118, February.
    52. Cassell, Cory A. & Huang, Shawn X. & Manuel Sanchez, Juan & Stuart, Michael D., 2012. "Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 588-610.
    53. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
    54. Kabir, Rezaul & Li, Hao & Veld-Merkoulova, Yulia V., 2013. "Executive compensation and the cost of debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 2893-2907.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tensie Steijvers & Wim Voordeckers & Koen Vanhoof, 2010. "Collateral, relationship lending and family firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 243-259, April.
    2. Biguri, Kizkitza, 2023. "How Does Access to the Unsecured Debt Market Affect Investment?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    3. Dias Duarte, Fábio & Matias Gama, Ana Paula & Paulo Esperança, José, 2017. "Collateral-based in SME lending: The role of business collateral and personal collateral in less-developed countries," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 406-422.
    4. Chengru Hu & Wei Jiang, 2019. "Managerial risk incentives and accounting conservatism," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 781-813, April.
    5. Cassell, Cory A. & Huang, Shawn X. & Manuel Sanchez, Juan & Stuart, Michael D., 2012. "Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 588-610.
    6. Hernán Ortiz-Molina & María Penas, 2008. "Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 361-383, April.
    7. Cheng-Few Lee & Chengru Hu & Maggie Foley, 2021. "Differential risk effect of inside debt, CEO compensation diversification, and firm investment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 505-543, February.
    8. Chen, Yangyang & Hasan, Iftekhar & Saffar, Walid & Zolotoy, Leon, 2021. "Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firms’ Choice of Debt Structure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    9. Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    10. Benmelech, Efraim & Kumar, Nitish & Rajan, Raghuram, 2022. "The secured credit premium and the issuance of secured debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 143-171.
    11. Aivazian, Varouj & Gu, Xinhua & Qiu, Jiaping & Huang, Bihong, 2015. "Loan collateral, corporate investment, and business cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 380-392.
    12. Li, Zhichuan Frank & Lin, Shannon & Sun, Shuna & Tucker, Alan, 2018. "Risk-adjusted inside debt," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 12-42.
    13. Michael Alderson & Naresh Bansal & Brian Betker, 2014. "Secured debt and managerial incentives," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 423-440, October.
    14. Li, Tongxia & Lu, Chun & Chen, Zhihua, 2023. "The unintended consequence of collateral-based financing: Evidence from corporate cost behavior," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1).
    15. Duong, Kiet Tuan & Banti, Chiara & Instefjord, Norvald, 2021. "Managerial conservatism and corporate policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    16. Zhang, Zhuang & Chizema, Amon & Kuo, Jing-Ming & Zhang, Qingjing, 2022. "Managerial risk-reducing incentives and social and exchange capital," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6).
    17. Wang, Yu-Lin, 2010. "Does collateral cause inefficient resource allocation?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 220-233, May.
    18. Castro, Paula & Keasey, Kevin & Amor-Tapia, Borja & Tascon, Maria T. & Vallascas, Francesco, 2020. "Does debt concentration depend on the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    19. Hainz, Christa & Dinh, Thanh & Kleimeier, Stefanie, 2011. "Collateral and its Determinants: Evidence from Vietnam," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 36, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    20. Dang, Viet A. & Phan, Hieu V., 2016. "CEO inside debt and corporate debt maturity structure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 38-54.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • R3 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277606. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.