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Policy diffusion and the competition for mobile resources

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  • Schneider, Andrea

Abstract

Reforms are often introduced in one region and afterwards adapted by other regions. This paper analyzes a model where policy diffusion can be explained by competition for mobile resources. I provide conditions under which initially symmetric regions realize reforms sequentially and a reform initiated in one region is afterwards adapted by another region. Forward-looking agents anticipate the policy convergence and respond less to the reform than the current difference in policies would imply.

Suggested Citation

  • Schneider, Andrea, 2017. "Policy diffusion and the competition for mobile resources," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168203, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168203
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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