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Majority voting and endogenous timing in tax competition

Author

Listed:
  • Hikaru Ogawa

    (The University of Tokyo
    The University of Tokyo)

  • Taiki Susa

    (Chubu University)

Abstract

We model a timing game in tax competition where the initial capital is unevenly endowed within the country and the tax policies are determined under a majority voting regime. The model is characterized by a novel feature: The decisive voter imports capital at the individual level, while the country exports it at the national level. The paper finds that governments endogenously choose to play a sequential-move game, which is unlikely to associate with full capital ownership in the tax competition literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2017. "Majority voting and endogenous timing in tax competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(3), pages 397-415, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:24:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10797-016-9424-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-016-9424-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Hikaru Ogawa & Atsushi Yamagishi, 2016. "Ad Valorem Capital Tax Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1030, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Haraguchi Junichi & Ogawa Hikaru, 2018. "Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-15, July.
    3. Tai‐Liang Chen & Ying Kuang, 2023. "Endogenous timing, strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 74-96, February.
    4. Atsushi Yamagishi, 2019. "Transboundary pollution, tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 1165-1194, August.
    5. Hikaru Ogawa & Taiki Susa, 2017. "Strategic delegation in asymmetric tax competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 237-251, November.
    6. Kawachi, Keisuke & Ogawa, Hikaru & Susa, Taiki, 2020. "Endogenous capital supply and equilibrium leadership in tax competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 622-634.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax competition; Endogenous timing; Voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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