Liquidity Regulation, the Central Bank, and the Money Market
As reliance on excessively short-term wholesale funding has been one of the major causes for the 2007-2009 financial crisis, recent advances in global liquidity regulation try to curb the excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding without being clear on how such an approach will affect the overall equilibrium on money markets. In particular, liquidity regulation may interfere with the central bank's influence on short-term money market rates. This paper tries to fill the gap in understanding the interaction between the money market, the central bank, and the regulator. Importantly, it shows that the existence of a central bank can be welfare-improving when the market equilibrium is driven by collateral constraints and asymmetric information. Regulation can be welfare-improving in the presence of an externality and also in case of collateral constraints, but reduces activity on the unsecured market. This implies that in case of collateral constraints the regulator can lead to a complete crowding out of the unsecured market which leads to an increased central bank intermediation need.
|Date of creation:||2013|
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