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Schienenpersonenfernverkehr zwischen Wettbewerb und Flächenanbindung: Handelbare Trassencredits als Ordnungsrahmen

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  • Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt

Abstract

Im Schienenpersonenfernverkehr entstehen zunehmend neue Angebote auf nachfragestarken Verbindungen. Diese Entwicklung ist wettbewerbspolitisch zu begrüßen. Sie legt aber ein institutionelles Problem offen: Der Zugang zu besonders attraktiven Trassen ist bislang kaum systematisch mit den Netzbeiträgen anderer Fernverkehrsleistungen verknüpft. Der Beitrag entwickelt ein Trassencredit-System als regelgebundenen Allokationsrahmen: Für besonders knappe Premiumtrassen müssen Credits eingesetzt werden; netzergänzende Fernverkehrsleistungen erzeugen Credits. Bewertet werden ausschließlich objektivierbare Verkehrsleistungen, nicht die historischen Kosten eines etablierten Betreibers. Ordnungsökonomisch überführt das Modell eine bislang implizite Netzverantwortung in ein regulatorisch definiertes, handelbares Nutzungsrecht innerhalb einer regelgebundenen Wettbewerbsordnung. Seine Tragfähigkeit hängt davon ab, ob zwei Fehlerquellen institutionell beherrscht werden: die Marktmacht eines dominanten Anbieters im Creditmarkt und die Vereinnahmung der Bewertungsregel.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt, 2026. "Schienenpersonenfernverkehr zwischen Wettbewerb und Flächenanbindung: Handelbare Trassencredits als Ordnungsrahmen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 212, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:343554
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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