IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/mpifgd/1116.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Wie die Europäische Kommission Liberalisierung durchsetzt: Der Konflikt um das öffentlich-rechtliche Bankenwesen in Deutschland

Author

Listed:
  • Seikel, Daniel

Abstract

Während der Finanzkrise beherrschten ausgerechnet öffentliche deutsche Landesbanken die Schlagzeilen. Eine Ursache für die Verwicklung der Landesbanken in die Finanzkrise ist die Liberalisierung des deutschen öffentlich-rechtlichen Bankenwesens durch die Europäische Kommission. Der Erfolg der Liberalisierungsbefürworter ist umso erstaunlicher, da die EU-Mitgliedstaaten ursprünglich nicht vorgesehen - und vorhergesehen - haben, dass das europäische Recht als ein Hebel für die Veränderung nationaler Finanzsysteme dienen würde. Wie konnte sich die Kommission gegen den entschlossenen Widerstand Deutschlands durchsetzen und so den Vorrang des europäischen Wettbewerbsrechts über vormals der nationalstaatlichen Regulierung vorbehaltene Bereiche etablieren? Dieser Artikel geht der Frage nach, warum sich die supranationale Dynamik selbst in hoch umstrittenen Fällen gegen die intergouvernementale Logik durchsetzt. In der Auseinandersetzung um deutsche öffentlich-rechtliche Banken hat die Kommission ihre wettbewerbsrechtlichen Kompetenzen mit politischen Strategien kombiniert, die auf die Interessenunterschiede innerhalb der Verteidigerkoalition zielten. So hat die Kommission nicht nur die Rückfallposition der Verteidiger verschoben, sondern auch deren Reihen entzweit: Zuvor nicht handlungsrelevante Interessenunterschiede brechen auf, die einstmals geschlossene Koalition der Verteidiger zerbricht. Der Fall veranschaulicht, wie die Kommission auch gegen den Willen der Mitgliedstaaten eigene politische Präferenzen durchsetzen kann.

Suggested Citation

  • Seikel, Daniel, 2011. "Wie die Europäische Kommission Liberalisierung durchsetzt: Der Konflikt um das öffentlich-rechtliche Bankenwesen in Deutschland," MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/16, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:1116
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51553/1/672241404.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Moravcsik, 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 473-524, December.
    2. Schmidt, Susanne K., 1998. "Liberalisierung in Europa: Die Rolle der Europäischen Kommission," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 33, number 33.
    3. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1992. "International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 533-560, April.
    4. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Two Logics of Delegation," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 103-122, February.
    5. Mitchell P. Smith, 2001. "Who are the Agents of Europeanization? EC Competition Policy and Germany's Public Law Banks," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 39, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    6. Jonathan Story & Ingo Walter, 1997. "Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: The Battle of the Systems," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262692031, December.
    7. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
    8. Emiliano Grossman, 2006. "Europeanization as an Interactive Process: German Public Banks Meet EU State Aid Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 325-348, June.
    9. Knill, Christoph & Lehmkuhl, Dirk, 1999. "How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of Europeanization," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 3, June.
    10. Michael W. Bauer, 2002. "The Commission and the Poverty Programmes," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 381-400, September.
    11. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Fantini, Marcella & Siniscalco, Domenico, 2004. "Privatisation around the world: evidence from panel data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 305-332, January.
    12. George Tsebelis & Geoffrey Garrett, 2000. "Legislative Politics in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 9-36, February.
    13. Burley, Anne-Marie & Mattli, Walter, 1993. "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 41-76, January.
    14. Schmidt, Vivien A., 2002. "The Futures of European Capitalism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199253685.
    15. Boix, Carles, 1997. "Privatizing the Public Business Sector in the Eighties: Economic Performance, Partisan Responses and Divided Governments," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(4), pages 473-496, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dederke, Julian, 2014. "Bahnliberalisierung in der Europäischen Union: Die Rolle des EuGH als politischer und politisch restringierter Akteur bei der Transformation staatsnaher Sektoren," PIPE - Papers on International Political Economy 20/2014, Free University Berlin, Center for International Political Economy, revised 2014.
    2. Fritz W. Scharpf, 2009. "The Asymmetry of European Integration - or why the EU cannot be a Social Market Economy," KFG Working Papers p0006, Free University Berlin.
    3. Susanne K. Schmidt, 2000. "Only an Agenda Setter?," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 37-61, February.
    4. Höpner, Martin & Petring, Alexander & Seikel, Daniel & Werner, Benjamin, 2009. "Liberalisierungspolitik: Eine Bestandsaufnahme von zweieinhalb Dekaden marktschaffender Politik in entwickelten Industrieländern," MPIfG Discussion Paper 09/7, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. repec:cdl:globco:qt799928k5 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2000. "Notes toward a theory of multilevel governing in Europe," MPIfG Discussion Paper 00/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    7. Belke, Ansgar H. & Baumgärtner, Frank & Schneider, Friedrich & Setzer, Ralph, 2005. "The Different Extent of Privatisation Proceeds in EU Countries: A Preliminary Explanation Using a Public Choice Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 1741, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Schuster, Philipp & Schmitt, Carina & Traub, Stefan, 2013. "The retreat of the state from entrepreneurial activities: A convergence analysis for OECD countries, 1980–2007," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 95-112.
    9. Höpner, Martin, 2008. "Usurpation statt Delegation: Wie der EuGH die Binnenmarktintegration radikalisiert und warum er politischer Kontrolle bedarf," MPIfG Discussion Paper 08/12, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    10. Mark A. Pollack, 2007. "The New Institutionalisms and European Integration," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0031, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
    11. Hristina RUNCHEVA TASEV & Milena APOSTOLOVSKA-STEPANOSKA & Leposava OGNJANOSKA, 2020. "Union based on the rule of law: the Court of Justice of the European Union and the (future of) European integration," Eastern Journal of European Studies, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 11, pages 396-426, December.
    12. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2010. "Community and autonomy: Institutions, policies and legitimacy in multilevel Europe," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 68, number 68.
    13. Höpner, Martin, 2014. "Wie der Europäische Gerichtshof und die Kommission Liberalisierung durchsetzen: Befunde aus der MPIfG-Forschungsgruppe zur Politischen Ökonomie der europäischen Integration," MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    14. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2009. "The double asymmetry of European integration: Or: why the EU cannot be a social market economy," MPIfG Working Paper 09/12, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    15. Sophie Jacquot & Cornelia Woll, 2003. "Usage of European Integration - Europeanisation from a Sociological Perspective," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01019642, HAL.
    16. Belkhir, Mohamed & Ben-Nasr, Hamdi, 2016. "Labor protection and the privatization or partial privatization method," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 305-322.
    17. Svejnar, Jan & Hagemejer, Jan & Tyrowicz, Joanna, 2018. "Are Rushed Privatizations Substandard? Analyzing Firm-level Privatization under Fiscal Pressure," CEPR Discussion Papers 12991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Ádám Szentpéteri & Álmos Telegdy, 2010. "Political Selection Of Firms Into Privatization Programs. Evidence From Romanian Comprehensive Data," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 298-328, November.
    19. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Political Ideology and Economic Freedom Across Canadian Provinces," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 143-166.
    20. Boubakri, Narjess & Guedhami, Omrane & Saffar, Walid, 2016. "Geographic location, foreign ownership, and cost of equity capital: Evidence from privatization," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 363-381.
    21. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Guedhami, Omrane & Saffar, Walid, 2011. "The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 244-258, April.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:1116. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mpigfde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.