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Bahnliberalisierung in der Europäischen Union: Die Rolle des EuGH als politischer und politisch restringierter Akteur bei der Transformation staatsnaher Sektoren

  • Dederke, Julian
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    Ehemals staatliche oder staatsnahe Sektoren wie der Schienenverkehr sind im Zuge der Europäischen Integration und des Binnenmarktprojekts einem markt- und wettbewerbsorientierten Liberalisierungsprozess ausgesetzt. Diesen treibt die Europäische Kommission (KOM) auf verschiedenen Wegen voran. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht eine Reihe von Vertragsverletzungsklagen der KOM gegen Mitgliedstaaten (MS), die keine ausreichenden Umsetzungsschritte bei der Eisenbahnliberalisierung ergriffen hätten. Mit dieser Klagewelle erhielt der EuGH erstmals die Möglichkeit zur Rechtsauslegung im Schienenverkehrssektor und fällte unterschiedliche Urteile. Die Arbeit fragt nach den Gründen für die Differenzierung im Angesicht der Rolle des EuGH als politischer und politisch restringierter Akteur. Diese wird in der wissenschaftlichen Debatte unterschiedlich bewertet: integrationsorientierter Liberalisierungsmotor einerseits, politisch restringiert innerhalb des politischen Umfelds andererseits. Anknüpfend an eine Debatte im American Political Science Review werden konkurrierende Hypothesen zur politischen Autonomie des EuGH generiert. In den Verfahren kam es zu zahlreichen Interventionen durch MS, die als Streithelfer aufseiten der Verklagten auftraten. Die Befunde der Arbeit weisen den Streithelfern in der untersuchten Klagewelle jedoch keinen zentralen Einfluss zu. Dagegen folgten die RichterInnen fast ausnahmslos den Empfehlungen des EuGH-Generalanwalts, der als unabhängiger Sachverständiger sachlich differenziert einzelne Rügen in Klageverfahren bestätigt oder zurückweist. Dies traf sowohl bei Empfehlungen zugunsten der Klägerin (KOM) als auch zugunsten der Verklagten (MS) zu. Das Urteilsmuster des EuGH zeigt außerdem, dass er Bahn-Holdingmodelle - als vertikal integrierte Unternehmensstrukturen einer der stärksten Konfliktpunkte zwischen KOM und MS - toleriert. Eine grundsätzlich liberalisierende und KOM-freundliche Positionierung des EuGH ist nicht erkennbar.

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    Paper provided by Free University Berlin, Center for International Political Economy in its series PIPE - Papers on International Political Economy with number 20/2014.

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    Date of creation: 2014
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubipe:202014
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/oekonomie/ipoe/index.html

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