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The political economy of law enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Dewey, Matías
  • Woll, Cornelia
  • Ronconi, Lucas

Abstract

The legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.

Suggested Citation

  • Dewey, Matías & Woll, Cornelia & Ronconi, Lucas, 2021. "The political economy of law enforcement," MaxPo Discussion Paper Series 21/1, Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:maxpod:211
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    12. Lucas Ronconi, 2012. "Globalization, Domestic Institutions, and Enforcement of Labor Law: Evidence from Latin America," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 89-105, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Radiakga Thabang Molokomme & Mpho Gift Motebe, 2025. "Blue lights and broken trust: Unmasking and reforming unethical conduct in South African law enforcement," International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478), Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 14(5), pages 515-524, July.
    2. Matías Dewey & Donato Di Carlo, 2022. "Governing through non‐enforcement: Regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(3), pages 930-950, July.

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