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The Political Economy Of Maritime Container Security

Author

Listed:
  • Button, Kenneth
  • Thibault, Marc

Abstract

The September 2001 attacks in the US raised significant concerns that containers may be used to carry out or facilitate terrorist attacks. The very large number of containers, the thousands of firms and the multitude individuals involved in container shipping, and limited government oversight over the global supply chain makes confronting this concern difficult. Further, organized crime has long used containers to smuggle narcotics, weapons, people and other contraband making it reasonable to assume terrorist groups may utilize containers to further their own ends. Containers are, however, an integral component of a global supply chain that has been designed to be fast and efficient. A terrorist attack that utilized containers and the maritime supply chain could not only damage the short and long-term credibility of the entire global logistics system, but it could damage the psyche of a nation’s citizens. Terrorism is ultimately about inflicting psychological damage. A loss of faith in the integrity of the world’s maritime shipping system would represent a major terrorist victory. The focus of this study is not on the technical apparatus available to enhance container security, but rather on the institutional and economic factors that will ultimately influence the effectiveness of security policies for the maritime shipping network.

Suggested Citation

  • Button, Kenneth & Thibault, Marc, 2005. "The Political Economy Of Maritime Container Security," 46th Annual Transportation Research Forum, Washington, D.C., March 6-8, 2005 208148, Transportation Research Forum.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ndtr05:208148
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.208148
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