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Die Kosten des Scheiterns und die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit bei disruptiven Innovationen

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  • Coatanlem, Yann
  • Coste, Oliver

Abstract

In diesem Artikel stellen wir fest, dass die Rentabilität von Hochrisiko-Technologieunternehmen, die mit hohen Ausfallraten einhergehen, in hohem Maße von den Restrukturierungskosten, also von den Kosten des Scheiterns, abhängt. Diese wiederum werden maßgeblich durch den arbeitsrechtlichen Kündigungsschutz mitbestimmt. Auf der Grundlage einer Kombination aus Finanzanalysen, empirischen Beobachtungen und vorhandener Literatur schätzen wir, dass die Restrukturierungskosten (die weit mehr als nur Abfindungszahlungen umfassen) in Ländern mit einem hohen arbeitsrechtlichen Kündigungsschutz, beispielsweise in Westeuropa, etwa zehnmal höher sind als in Ländern mit geringem arbeitsrechtlichem Kündigungsschutz, beispielsweise in den USA. Wir zeigen auf, dass sich dieser Kostenunterschied in niedrigeren Kapitalrenditen im Technologiesektor niederschlägt, und bestätigen dies empirisch. Wir erläutern außerdem, dass die Kosten des Scheiterns - also die Ausgaben für die Einstellung erfolgloser Projekte - ein entscheidender Faktor für den Rückstand Europas im Technologiesektor sind. Dieser Faktor hat erhebliche Folgen für die europäische Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, Lebensstandard und Sicherheit. Eine zentrale Erkenntnis ist hierbei, dass die Restrukturierungskosten auch dann eine Rolle spielen, wenn sie nur für größere Unternehmen gelten, da die hohen Renditen der wenigen Gewinner erst dann realisiert werden können, wenn diese größer geworden sind. Wir schlagen daraufhin Reformen vor, die die wachsende Kluft zwischen Europa und den USA sowie China schließen würden, ohne dabei das europäische Sozialmodell zu gefährden.

Suggested Citation

  • Coatanlem, Yann & Coste, Oliver, 2025. "Die Kosten des Scheiterns und die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit bei disruptiven Innovationen," LEF Policy Papers 6, Ludwig-Erhard-Forum für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (LEF), Berlin.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:lefpps:336635
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Roberto M. Samaniego, 2006. "Employment Protection and High-Tech Aversion," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 224-241, April.
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