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The public loss game: An experimental study of public bads

  • Schosser, Stephan
  • Vogt, Bodo
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    We analyze cooperative behavior of participants who faced a loss. In particular, we extend the Public Good Game by a fixed loss in the beginning of every period. We show that humans change their behavior compared to corresponding studies with gains only. First, in contrast to literature on gains, we observe significant order effects. When participants first play a treatment with punishment, they cooperate less and face higher punishment costs than when first playing a treatment without punishment. The changes are that drastic that punishment does not pay in the first case, while it does in the later. Second, for participants first playing without punishment the contributions in the very first period of play determine the contributions throughout both treatments of the game, yielding higher contributions in the punishment treatment than when playing with gains. Participants punishing first, show no comparable behavior.

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    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/50508/1/667027807.pdf
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    Paper provided by Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 33.

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    Date of creation: 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:kitwps:33
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.wiwi.kit.edu/

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    1. Stoyanov, Stoyan V. & Rachev, Svetlozar T. & Racheva-Iotova, Boryana & Fabozzi, Frank J., 2011. "Fat-tailed models for risk estimation," Working Paper Series in Economics 30, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
    2. Shin Kim, Young & Rachev, Svetlozar T. & Leonardo Bianchi, Michele & Fabozzi, Frank J., 2010. "Tempered stable and tempered infinitely divisible GARCH models," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 2096-2109, September.
    3. Sebastian Kube & Michel Andre Marechal & Clemens Puppe, 2012. "The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1644-62, June.
    4. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    5. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. Bianchi, Michele Leonardo & Rachev, Svetlozar T. & Kim, Young Shin & Fabozzi, Frank J., 2011. "Tempered infinitely divisible distributions and processes," Working Paper Series in Economics 26, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
    7. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    8. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Karla Hoff & Mayuresh Kshetramade, 2008. "Spite and Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 494-99, May.
    10. Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA.
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