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How Can Voters Classify an Incumbent under Output Persistence

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  • Caleiro, António

Abstract

The literature on electoral cycles has developed in two distinct phases. The first one considered the existence of non-rational (naive) voters whereas the second one considered fully rational voters. In our perspective, an intermediate approach is more interesting, i.e. one that considers learning voters, which are boundedly rational. In this sense, neural networks may be considered as learning mechanisms used by voters to perform a classification of the incumbent in order to distinguish opportunistic (electorally motivated) from benevolent (non-electorally motivated) behaviour. The paper shows in which circumstances a neural network, namely a perceptron, can resolve that problem of classification. This is done by considering a model allowing for output persistence, which is a feature of aggregate supply that, indeed, may make it impossible to correctly classify the incumbent.

Suggested Citation

  • Caleiro, António, 2008. "How Can Voters Classify an Incumbent under Output Persistence," Economics Discussion Papers 2008-16, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gartner, Manfred, 1996. "Political business cycles when real activity is persistent," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 679-692.
    2. Kiley, Michael T, 2000. "Endogenous Price Stickiness and Business Cycle Persistence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(1), pages 28-53, February.
    3. Gartner, Manfred, 1997. "Time-Consistent Monetary Policy under Output Persistence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 429-437, September.
    4. Evans, George W., 1986. "Selection criteria for models with non-uniqueness," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 147-157, September.
    5. Cripps, Martin, 1988. "Learning Rational Expectations In A Policy Game," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 297, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Classification; elections; incumbent; neural networks; output; persistence; perceptrons;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C45 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Neural Networks and Related Topics

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