Tax competition and determination of the quality of public goods
In this paper, the authors analyze the behavior of local governments on capital taxation when the financial choices in terms of a public good quality are done by a central planner. More specifically, they ask the question whether a local government has an interest to tax the mobile factor in addition to the tax on representative households or not. The authors show, through a comparison of social welfare given the strategies chosen by the locals governments, that whatever the quality of the public good and its cost is, a local government always has an interest to tax the mobile factor. This leads to a Nash-equilibrium in dominant strategy in their model.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel|
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814528
Web page: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
- Hoyt, William H & Jensen, Richard A, 2001.
" Product Differentiation and Public Education,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 69-93.
- Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
- Wildasin, D.E., 1987.
"Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1987020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- G. Donald Jud & James M. Watts, 1981. "Schools and Housing Values," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 57(3), pages 459-470.
- Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986.
"Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March.
- Mintz, J. & Tulkens, H., 1984. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 1984027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MINTZ, Jack & TULKENS, Henry, . "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers RP 693, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Todd M. Gabe & Kathleen P. Bell, 2004. "Tradeoffs between Local Taxes and Government Spending as Determinants of Business Location," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 21-41.
- Henderson, J Vernon & Thisse, Jacques-François, 1997. "On the Strategic Community Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 1550, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Wildasin, David E., 1991. "Some rudimetary 'duopolity' theory," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 393-421, November.
- Fatica, Serena, 2009.
"Taxation and the quality of institutions: asymmetric effects on FDI,"
24179, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2010.
- Serena Fatica, 2010. "Taxation and the Quality of Institutions: Asymmetric Effects on FDI," Taxation Papers 21, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201331. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.