On the Strategic Community Development
This paper examines strategic behaviour of developers who, through offering different public good packages and revenue/fiscal schemes, compete for residents who are differentiated by income. There is an endogenous determination of numbers and sizes of communities. Developers have an incentive to strongly differentiate their public good offerings. In terms of pricing strategies, developers exhibit sharply contrasting behaviours. In low-income communities housing consumption is subsidized once lots are priced. In high-income communities housing consumption is generally taxed.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.|
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1550. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.