Competence, loyalty & exit evidence from Iranian provinces
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DOI: 10.17169/refubium-52114
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
- P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ARA-2026-09-07 (MENA - Middle East and North Africa)
- NEP-POL-2026-09-07 (Positive Political Economics)
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