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Competence, loyalty & exit evidence from Iranian provinces

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  • Grigoriadis, Theocharis
  • Shahmohammadi, Shahrzad

Abstract

We study the political careers of provincial governors in Iran and ask whether competence and loyalty shape the risk of exit from office. Using province-year panel data with province and year fixed effects, we implement two IV strategies to address selection into hard postings and measurement error. To identify competence, we use a shift-share (Bartik) "merit shifter" that interacts predetermined provincial exposure to oil-linked fiscal capacity with national oil-price movements, generating plausibly exogenous variation in measured performance across provinces over time. To identify loyalty, we instrument parliamentary turnout with election-year voting-cost shocks: election-day temperature (and nonlinear transformations) interacted with an election-year indicator, which shifts participation when voting is salient but is orthogonal to governor retention decisions conditional on fixed effects and controls. Our estimates show that higher instrumented competence increases the probability of exit, especially along the rotation margin, while loyalty has weaker and less stable effects once endogeneity is addressed. We explain the competence-exit link through a performance-driven rotation model: the center deploys high performers to difficult provinces and then reassigns them quickly once acute constraints are relieved. In that sense, crisis posts are designed for short tenures ("send Ç fix Ç move"). An alternative discipline mechanism may suggest that competent governors face removal when their actions threaten entrenched interests. Nevertheless, this mechanism receives less consistent support in baseline specifications. Identification is strong for competence (weak-IV-robust tests reject the null), and the core findings are stable across aligned specifications. Substantively, the evidence suggests that managerial capacity is leveraged intensively rather than rewarded with tenure, underscoring the importance of distinguishing rotation from punishment in authoritarian personnel management.

Suggested Citation

  • Grigoriadis, Theocharis & Shahmohammadi, Shahrzad, 2026. "Competence, loyalty & exit evidence from Iranian provinces," Discussion Papers 2026/14, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:342460
    DOI: 10.17169/refubium-52114
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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