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Forever Young? Ein dynamisches Strukturmodell für Erbbaurechte

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  • Löhr, Dirk

Abstract

Der Beitrag entwickelt ein dynamisches Strukturmodell des Erbbaurechts (D) und vergleicht es mit Volleigentum (V) sowie einem konventionellen Erbbaurecht (K), bei dem der Erbbauzins an den Verbraucherpreisindex gekop-pelt fortgeschrieben wird. Ausgangspunkt ist ein einfaches Problem: K kann über lange Laufzeiten wirtschaftlich altern. Der Erbbauzins entfernt sich vom standortbezogenen Bodenertrag, die Restlaufzeit sinkt und die Finanzie-rung wird schwieriger. D setzt genau an diesen Punkten an. Im Referenzfall folgt der Erbbauzins einem extern beobachtbaren Bodenertrags-Proxy; zugleich wird die Restlaufzeit regelgebunden stabilisiert. Der Rohproxy verbindet den zonalen Bodenrichtwert mit einem Bodenertragssatz aus geglätteter langfristiger Bundesrendite und einem bei Vertragsbeginn kalibrierten, danach fixierten Aufschlag. Kurzfristige Ausschläge können über eine vertragliche Glättung gedämpft werden. Als einfachere und verständlichere Alternative bleibt eine lage- und seg-mentbezogene Referenzmiete möglich. Analysiert werden drei eng verbundene Kanäle: Bodenertrag und Bewer-tung, Laufzeit und Rechte sowie Finanzierung und Kapitalstruktur. Die Superiorität wird als Differenz des ge-meinsamen monetären Sicherheitsäquivalentwerts von Bodeninvestor und operativem Investor gegenüber dem jeweiligen Referenzmodell gemessen; für den D-K-Vergleich wird daraus eine Superioritätsmarge gebildet. Die zentrale These lautet: D ist K nicht nur in günstigen Einzelfällen überlegen. Wo die für K typischen Anpas-sungs-, Laufzeit- und Finanzierungsfriktionen wirtschaftlich relevant sind und die zusätzlichen Kosten sowie die kurzfristige Proxyvolatilität von D begrenzt bleiben, ist D regelmäßig gegenüber K superior. Gegenüber V ist die Aussage enger: D kann V dann übertreffen, wenn die Vorteile der Bodentrennung - insbesondere bessere Risiko-zuordnung, geringere Finanzierungs- und Distressfriktionen sowie stabilere Nutzungsrechte - die zusätzlichen Transaktions-, Informations-, Kontroll- und Governancekosten der Aufspaltung übersteigen. Die Modellrech-nungen zeigen, dass diese Bedingungen in ökonomisch plausiblen Größenordnungen erfüllt sein können; der empirische Nachweis ihrer Marktbreite bleibt Aufgabe weiterer Tests.

Suggested Citation

  • Löhr, Dirk, 2026. "Forever Young? Ein dynamisches Strukturmodell für Erbbaurechte," EconStor Preprints 344075, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:344075
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General

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