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How much Priority Bonus Should be Given to Registered Donors? An Experimental Analysis

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  • Herr, Annika
  • Normann, Hans-Theo

Abstract

Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting list can substantially increase the number of donors and save lifes. Evidence for these effects comes from recent experiments that implemented such priority rules in abstract laboratory environments. In these experiments, participants who registered as organ donors were fully prioritized over those who did not. In the field, however, registering as a donor is only one factor affecting the recipient’s score. In this paper, we provide a comparative statics analysis of the priority treatment by varying the number of bonus periods that a registered person can skip on the waiting list. We find that behavior is monotonic: giving more priority to registered donors leads to higher registration rates. Our results also indicate that a medium sized bonus improves registration rates as much as absolute priority (used in the previous literature).

Suggested Citation

  • Herr, Annika & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2018. "How much Priority Bonus Should be Given to Registered Donors? An Experimental Analysis," DICE Discussion Papers 306, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:306
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herr, Annika & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2016. "Organ donation in the lab: Preferences and votes on the priority rule," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 139-149.
    2. Hawley, Zackary & Li, Danyang & Schnier, Kurt & Turgeon, Nicole, 2018. "Can we increase organ donation by reducing the disincentives? An experimental analysis," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 128-137.
    3. Avraham Stoler & Judd B. Kessler & Tamar Ashkenazi & Alvin E. Roth & Jacob Lavee, 2017. "Incentivizing Organ Donor Registrations with Organ Allocation Priority," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 500-510, April.
    4. Li, Danyang & Hawley, Zackary & Schnier, Kurt, 2013. "Increasing organ donation via changes in the default choice or allocation rule," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1117-1129.
    5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    6. Kessler, Judd B. & Roth, Alvin E., 2014. "Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 19-28.
    7. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2014. "Don't Take 'No' For An Answer: An Experiment With Actual Organ Donor Registrations," NBER Working Papers 20378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Judd B. Kessler & Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2018-2047, August.
    9. Li, Danyang, 2016. "Effect of persuasive messages on organ donation decisions: An experimental test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 150-159.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    organ donation; laboratory experiment; priority rule; waiting list;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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