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Organ Donation in the Lab: Preferences and Votes on the Priority Rule

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  • Herr, Annika
  • Normann, Hans-Theo

Abstract

An allocation rule that prioritizes registered donors increases the willingness to register for organ donation, as laboratory experiments show. In public opinion, however, this priority rule faces repugnance. We explore the discrepancy by implementing a vote on the rule in a donation experiment, and we also elicit opinion poll-like views. We find that two-thirds of the participants voted for the priority rule in the experiment. When asked about real-world implementation, participants of the donation experiment were more likely to support the rule than non-participants. We further confirm previous research in that the priority rule increases donation rates. Beyond that, we find that medical school students donate more often than participants from other fields.

Suggested Citation

  • Herr, Annika & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2015. "Organ Donation in the Lab: Preferences and Votes on the Priority Rule," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113133, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:113133
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    Cited by:

    1. Herr, Annika & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2019. "How much priority bonus should be given to registered organ donors? An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 367-378.
    2. Niu, Xiaofei & Li, Jianbiao, 2020. "Incentivizing organ donation by swearing an oath: The role of signature and ritual," EconStor Preprints 203243, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, revised 2020.
    3. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.
    4. Céline Bonnet & Jan Philip Schain, 2020. "An Empirical Analysis Of Mergers: Efficiency Gains And Impact On Consumer Prices," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-35.
    5. Herr, Annika & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2018. "How much Priority Bonus Should be Given to Registered Donors? An Experimental Analysis," DICE Discussion Papers 306, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    6. Han, Hua-Jing & Wibral, Matthias, 2020. "Organ donation and reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    7. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2022. "Remedying adverse selection in donor-priority rule using freeze period: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 384-407.
    8. Finocchiaro Castro, Massimo & Guccio, Calogero & Romeo, Domenica, 2022. "A systematic literature review of 10 years of behavioral research on health services," EconStor Preprints 266248, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    9. Hawley, Zackary & Li, Danyang & Schnier, Kurt & Turgeon, Nicole, 2018. "Can we increase organ donation by reducing the disincentives? An experimental analysis," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 128-137.
    10. Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2021. "Organ donation with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General

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