The interplay of legal and social norms and the failure of the bank credit market in Bulgaria
We take up the widely held view that the observed discrepancy between law on the books and law in action has prevented economic transition and investigate its role for the failure of the Bulgarian credit market. In doing so, we focus on the role of injunctive informal institutions which have become internalized in the course of social development. Based on cross-cultural psychology, we show that a particular bundle of fundamental social norms which constitute basic value orientations have both prevented the development of stabilizing regulations and an overall compliance with prevailing laws.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/forschung/zoess/english-versioncess/|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth Koford & Adrian E. Tschoegl, 1997. "Problems of Bank Lending in Bulgaria: Information Asymmetry and Institutional Learning," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-41, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Nikolay Nenovsky & Evgeni Peev & Todor Yalamov, 2003. "Banks-Firms Nexus under the Currency Board: Empirical Evidence from Bulgaria," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 555, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cessdp:04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.