Third degree waiting time discrimination: optimal allocation of a public sector health care treatment under rationing by waiting
In many public health care systems treatment is rationed by waiting time. We examine the optimal allocation of a .xed supply of a treatment between di¤erent groups of patients. Even in the absence of any distributional aims welfare is increased by third degree waiting time discrimination. Because waiting time imposes dead weight losses on patients, lower waiting times should be o¤ered to groups with higher marginal waiting time costs and with less elastic demand for the treatment.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom|
Phone: (0)1904 323776
Web page: https://www.york.ac.uk/economics/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hoel, Michael & Saether, Erik Magnus, 2003.
"Public health care with waiting time: the role of supplementary private health care,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 599-616, July.
- Michael Hoel & Erik Magnus Sæther, 2001. "Public Health Care with Waiting Time: The Role of Supplementary Private Health Care," CESifo Working Paper Series 562, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hugh Gravelle & Luigi Siciliani, 2006.
"Is Waiting-time Prioritisation Welfare Improving?,"
06/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Lindsay, Cotton M & Feigenbaum, Bernard, 1984. "Rationing by Waiting Lists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 404-417, June.
- Gravelle, Hugh & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008.
"Ramsey waits: Allocating public health service resources when there is rationing by waiting,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1143-1154, September.
- Hugh Gravelle & Luigi Siciliani, 2007. "Ramsey Waits: Allocating Public Health Service Resources when there is Rationing by Waiting," Discussion Papers 07/15, Department of Economics, University of York.
- repec:rus:hseeco:122140 is not listed on IDEAS
- Luigi Siciliani, 2008. "A note on the dynamic interaction between waiting times and waiting lists," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(5), pages 639-647.
- Hugh Gravelle & Peter Smith & Ana Xavier, 2003. "Performance signals in the public sector: the case of health care," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 81-103, January.
- Gianni De Fraja, 2005.
"Reverse Discrimination And Efficiency In Education,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 1009-1031, 08.
- Gianni De Fraja, 2003. "Reverse Discrimination and Efficiency in Education," CEIS Research Paper 38, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Martin, Stephen & Rice, Nigel & Jacobs, Rowena & Smith, Peter, 2007. "The market for elective surgery: Joint estimation of supply and demand," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 263-285, March.
- Farnworth, Michael G., 2003. "A game theoretic model of the relationship between prices and waiting times," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 47-60, January.
- Hugh Gravelle & Luigi Siciliani, 2007. "Optimal Waits and Charges in Health Insurance," Discussion Papers 07/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Jeremy Hurst & Luigi Siciliani, 2003. "Tackling Excessive Waiting Times for Elective Surgery: A Comparison of Policies in Twelve OECD Countries," OECD Health Working Papers 6, OECD Publishing.
- Martin, Stephen & Smith, Peter C., 1999. "Rationing by waiting lists: an empirical investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 141-164, January.
- Hoel, Michael, 2007. "What should (public) health insurance cover?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 251-262, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:07/22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Hodgson)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.