IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/hlthec/v18y2009i8p977-986.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Third degree waiting time discrimination: optimal allocation of a public sector healthcare treatment under rationing by waiting

Author

Listed:
  • Hugh Gravelle

    (National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK)

  • Luigi Siciliani

    (Department of Economics and Related Studies, Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK)

Abstract

In many public healthcare systems treatments are rationed by waiting time. We examine the optimal allocation of a fixed supply of a given treatment between different groups of patients. Even in the absence of any distributional aims, welfare is increased by third degree waiting time discrimination: setting different waiting times for different groups waiting for the same treatment. Because waiting time imposes dead weight losses on patients, lower waiting times should be offered to groups with higher marginal waiting time costs and with less elastic demand for the treatment. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Hugh Gravelle & Luigi Siciliani, 2009. "Third degree waiting time discrimination: optimal allocation of a public sector healthcare treatment under rationing by waiting," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(8), pages 977-986.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:18:y:2009:i:8:p:977-986
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.1423
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/hec.1423
    File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin, Stephen & Rice, Nigel & Jacobs, Rowena & Smith, Peter, 2007. "The market for elective surgery: Joint estimation of supply and demand," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 263-285, March.
    2. Gravelle, Hugh & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008. "Ramsey waits: Allocating public health service resources when there is rationing by waiting," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1143-1154, September.
    3. Luigi Siciliani, 2008. "A note on the dynamic interaction between waiting times and waiting lists," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(5), pages 639-647.
    4. Gianni De Fraja, 2005. "Reverse Discrimination And Efficiency In Education," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 1009-1031, August.
    5. Farnworth, Michael G., 2003. "A game theoretic model of the relationship between prices and waiting times," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 47-60, January.
    6. Lindsay, Cotton M & Feigenbaum, Bernard, 1984. "Rationing by Waiting Lists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 404-417, June.
    7. Hoel, Michael & Saether, Erik Magnus, 2003. "Public health care with waiting time: the role of supplementary private health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 599-616, July.
    8. Hugh Gravelle & Luigi Siciliani, 2008. "Is waiting-time prioritisation welfare improving?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 167-184.
    9. Hugh Gravelle & Peter Smith & Ana Xavier, 2003. "Performance signals in the public sector: the case of health care," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 81-103, January.
    10. Jeremy Hurst & Luigi Siciliani, 2003. "Tackling Excessive Waiting Times for Elective Surgery: A Comparison of Policies in Twelve OECD Countries," OECD Health Working Papers 6, OECD Publishing.
    11. repec:rus:hseeco:122140 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Martin, Stephen & Smith, Peter C., 1999. "Rationing by waiting lists: an empirical investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 141-164, January.
    13. Hoel, Michael, 2007. "What should (public) health insurance cover?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 251-262, March.
    14. Hugh Gravelle & Luigi Siciliani, 2007. "Optimal Waits and Charges in Health Insurance," Discussion Papers 07/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peter Sivey, 2016. "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Hospital Emergency Department Waiting Times and Demand," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2016n13, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    2. Mark Stabile & Sarah Thomson, 2014. "The Changing Role of Government in Financing Health Care: An International Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 480-518, June.
    3. Dixon, Huw & Siciliani, Luigi, 2009. "Waiting-time targets in the healthcare sector: How long are we waiting?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1081-1098, December.
    4. Gutacker, Nils & Siciliani, Luigi & Cookson, Richard, 2016. "Waiting time prioritisation: Evidence from England," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 140-151.
    5. Grassi, Simona & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2011. "Optimal public rationing and price response," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1197-1206.
    6. Huw Dixon & Luigi Siciliani, 2009. "Waiting Time Targets in Healthcare Markets: How Long Are We Waiting?," Discussion Papers 09/05, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Laura Levaggi & Rosella Levaggi, 2016. "Welfare analysis of rationing in health care provision," Working papers 39, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    8. repec:kap:ijhcfe:v:17:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10754-016-9209-1 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:18:y:2009:i:8:p:977-986. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.