Risk Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance - the Case of France
It is widely recognized that “market failure” prevents e¢ cient risk sharing in natural disaster insurance. As a consequence, many countries adopted institutional frameworks involving public-private partnerships”. We de…ne risk selection as a situation where private companies pass insurance of high risk agents on to the public sector. We argue that this is a potentially important issue in such partnerships, illustrating our concerns with the case of France. We build a simple model that incorporates the main features of the system, such as the risk independent premium rate and the existence of a state reinsurer. We show that in our model, risk selection is likely to be present in equilibrium and discuss the policy options available. We …nd that the "stylized facts" of the French system correspond to our results. Additionally, the policies implemented by the gvernment correspond to policies characterized to reduce the potential of risk selection.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2006|
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