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A Model of Online Misinformation with Endogenous Reputation

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  • Lau, Andy

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Misinformation dissemination in social media has emerged as a critical contemporary issue. This paper augments existing models of online misinformation by incorporating endogenous reputation dynamics. In contrast to prior research, reputation plays a pivotal role in shaping agents Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy through two key avenues : (i) the sharer’s reputation positively impacts the likelihood of sharing, and (ii) agents with higher initial reputations are less willing to share compared to their counterparts with lower initial reputations. Furthermore, this paper provides insights into the formation of individuals’ networks on social media. Surprisingly, individuals with high reputations are not universally favoured as network connections. Additionally, the paper examines relevant comparative statics, including the importance of interactions, and the implications of homophily. This research establishes a foundation for understanding the dynamics of reputation-based information sharing and network structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Lau, Andy, 2023. "A Model of Online Misinformation with Endogenous Reputation," Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers 59, Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:59
    as

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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/wmesp/manage/59_-_andy_lau.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Lunawat, Radhika, 2013. "An experimental investigation of reputation effects of disclosure in an investment/trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 130-144.
    3. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information sharing ; misinformation ; reputation ; network ; social media JEL classifications: C72 ; D83 ; D85;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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