The Double Majority Voting Rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a Democratic Ideal for an Enlarging Union : an Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis
The Double Majority rule in the Treaty is claimed to be simpler, more transparent and more democratic than the existing rule. We examine these questions against the democratic ideal that the votes of all citizens in whatever member country should be of equal value using voting power analysis considering possible future enlargements involving candidate countries and then to a number of hypothetical future enlargements. We find the Double Majority rule to fails to measure up to the democratic ideal in all cases. We find the Jagiellonian compromise to be very close to this ideal.
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- Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez Garcia, J. R. & Lopez, J. J., 2003. "Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 63-80, August.
- Aziz, Haris & Paterson, Mike & Leech, Dennis, 2007. "Combinatorial and computational aspects of multiple weighted voting games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 823, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-64, December.
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