Multicameral voting cohesion games
This work links two research branches regarding cooperative games: multi-cameral games and a priori coalitions. Regarding the former, many parliaments are based on a bicameral system where bills have to be approved by both chambers. The parties’ power indices are affected by it. In fact one certain political party for one certain coalition can be crucial in one chamber and not in the other. Usually the problem can be solved by building a unified game, related to two or more chambers, where the global power indices can be calculated. Concerning cohesion games, some coalitions among parties might be possible, but have a low probability of materializing if the parties involved have very different ideologies. It is necessary to take this into consideration when we compute the relative power indices. In this work, a model is built that takes into consideration both topics. An automatic calculation algorithm is elaborated and is applied to the current situations in Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania, considering the location of the parties on the left-right axis. This model is then applied globally to the European Union. In this work the model is applied to Politics, but its applications are not limited to that field. For instance, in Finance it can be applied to describe agreements for debt restructuring and corporate mergers. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2009
Volume (Year): 17 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Gianfranco Gambarelli, 2007. "Transforming Games From Characteristic Into Normal Form," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(01), pages 87-104.
- Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez, J. R. & Jimenez, N. & Lopez, J. J., 2002. "Voting power in the European Union enlargement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 181-196, November.
- Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez Garcia, J. R. & Lopez, J. J., 2003. "Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 63-80, August.
- J. Bilbao & J. Fernández & A. Losada & J. López, 2000. "Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently," TOP- An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 8(2), pages 191-213, December.
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