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The Double Majority Voting Rule Of The Eu Reform Treaty As A Democratic Ideal For An Enlarging Union: An Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis

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  • Leech, Dennis

Abstract

The Double Majority rule in the Treaty is claimed to be simpler, more transparent and more democratic than the existing rule. We examine these questions against the democratic ideal that the votes of all citizens in whatever member country should be of equal value using voting power analysis considering possible future enlargements involving candidate countries and then to a number of hypothetical future enlargements. We find the Double Majority rule to fails to measure up to the democratic ideal in all cases. We find the Jagiellonian compromise to be very close to this ideal.

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  • Leech, Dennis, 2007. "The Double Majority Voting Rule Of The Eu Reform Treaty As A Democratic Ideal For An Enlarging Union: An Appraisal Using Voting Power Analysis," Economic Research Papers 269773, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269773
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269773
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aziz, Haris & Paterson, Mike & Leech, Dennis, 2007. "Combinatorial and computational aspects of multiple weighted voting games," Economic Research Papers 269772, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Fiona Hayes‐Renshaw & Wim Van Aken & Helen Wallace, 2006. "When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 161-194, March.
    3. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    4. Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez Garcia, J. R. & Lopez, J. J., 2003. "Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 63-80, August.
    5. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 437-464, December.
    6. Aziz, Haris & Paterson, Mike & Leech, Dennis, 2007. "Combinatorial and computational aspects of multiple weighted voting games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 823, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meyer, Eric, 2013. "Die Macht der Mitgliedstaaten im Ministerrat der EU und im Ministerrat für Fragen der Währungsunion nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon," Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 36, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).

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