Loss Aversion, Presidential Responsibility, and Midterm Congressional Elections
I explore a behavioral model of political participation, first introduced by Quattrone and Tversky , based on the primitives of prospect theory, as defined by Kahneman and Tversky . The model offers an alternative explanation for why the President’s party tends to lose seats in midterm congressional elections. The model is examined empirically and compared against competing explanations for the “midterm phenomenon”.
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- Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
- Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1988. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 2706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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