Solving Models with Imperfect and Asymmetric Information
We consider linear dynamic models with rational expectations in case of incomplete and asymmetric information as well as agents heterogeneity. This problem requires solving infinite dimensional matrix equations. We propose asymptotic expansion method to reduce this problem to the finite dimensional problem.
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- Svensson, Lars E. O. & Woodford, Michael, 2001.
"Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Information,"
689, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E. O. & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 661-690, January.
- Lars E.O. Svensson & Michael Woodford, 2001. "Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy under Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 8255, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Collard, Fabrice & Dellas, Harris, 2004. "The New Keynesian Model with Imperfect Information and Learning," IDEI Working Papers 273, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Pawel Kowal, 2005. "An Algorithm for Solving Arbitrary Linear Rational Expectations Model," GE, Growth, Math methods 0501001, EconWPA, revised 12 Jun 2005.
- Gerali, Andrea & Lippi, Francesco, 2003. "Optimal Control and Filtering in Linear Forward-looking Economies: A Toolkit," CEPR Discussion Papers 3706, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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