Uncovering Policy Makers' Loss Function
The quadratic form of policy makers' loss function has gained a wide consensus in monetary policy analysis mainly because of its analytical tractability. A number of researchers, however, have recently proposed alternative functional forms which have also proved to yield tractable solutions of the central bank optimization problem. Using a nonparametric specification of the output gap argument into the loss function, this paper attempts to discriminate among three classes of proposals through the evidence drawn upon the form of the US efficient policy frontier.
|Date of creation:||16 Oct 2002|
|Note:||Type of Document - tex; prepared on pc; to print on hp; pages: 9; figures: included|
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