The Underground Labor Market between Social Norms and Economic Inventives
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References listed on IDEAS
- Huck, Steffen & Kübler, Dorothea & Weibull, Jörgen, 2001.
"Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms,"
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- S. Huck & D. Kübler & J. Weibull, 2002. "Social norms and optimal incentives in firms," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2002,11, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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More about this item
KeywordsUnderground Labor Market; Social Norms; Evolutionary Games; Policy Incentives;
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2005-01-23 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-REG-2005-01-23 (Regulation)
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