IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpga/0112001.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes

Author

Listed:
  • Paola Manzini

    (Queen Mary, University of London and IZA)

  • Clara Ponsati'

    (Institut d'Analisi Economica - CSIC and CODE - Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third party involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willigness of the stake holders to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to the tendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati', 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," Game Theory and Information 0112001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112001
    Note: Type of Document - WordPerfect; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP; pages: 38
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0112/0112001.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-565, May.
    4. Ponsati C. & Sakovics, J., 1996. "The war of attrition with incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 54-54, February.
    5. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsat?Author-Name: Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 502.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2001. "Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 170-195, October.
    7. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September.
    2. Schettkat, Ronald & Yocarini, Lara, 2001. "Education Driving the Rise in Dutch Female Employment: Explanations for the Increase in Part-time Work and Female Employment in the Netherlands, Contrasted with Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 407, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Manzini, Paola & Ponsati, Clara, 2005. "Stakeholders in bilateral conflict," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 166-180, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Vicente Calabuig, 1999. "Ineficiencias de las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados: un panorama," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(3), pages 303-329, September.
    3. Mumcu, Ayşe, 1999. "Firm-Specific Skills, Wage Bargaining, and Efficiency," MPRA Paper 1913, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Taiji Furusawa & Quan Wen, 2001. "Unique Inneficient Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining with Complete Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0121, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    5. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2006. "Wage Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations Act," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1017-1039, December.
    6. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 273-279, May.
    7. Manzini, Paola, 1999. "Strategic bargaining with destructive power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 315-322, December.
    8. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Backward induction and unacceptable offers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 151-156.
    9. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
    10. Furusawa, Taiji & Wen, Quan, 2002. "Disagreement points in trade negotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 133-150, June.
    11. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
    12. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 260-276, August.
    13. Gao, Hong & Xu, Haibo, 2021. "Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    14. Bahar Leventoğlu, 2017. "Bargaining with habit formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 477-508, October.
    15. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
    16. Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2007. "Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 214-235, July.
    17. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-028/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
    19. Li, Duozhe, 2011. "The power to delay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 155-157, August.
    20. Ayşe Mumcu, 2010. "Strategic Withholding Of Firm‐Specific Skills In Wage Bargaining," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(2), pages 187-211, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; public sector; stakeholders; strikes; labour relations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.