Toward a Theory of Asset Subscription
This paper develops an understanding toward a theory of asset subscription. When a firm needs to raise cash from an asset that is too large or too risky for a single individual or financial institution so that an auction method is not applicable, the firm may use a subscription scheme. In this paper, we discuss a Nash subscription (NS) scheme and a sequential subscription (SS) scheme. We characterize the optimal strategy when the value of the asset is known. The comparison between a NS and a SS is provided. The difference between an auction scheme and a subscription scheme is discussed.
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