How Hierarchical Structures Impact on Competition
Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous product were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by firms arranged into groups of different hierarchical levels.
Volume (Year): 2 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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- Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1986. "Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(2-3), pages 115-118.
- Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Stackelberg and Marshall," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 69-82, March.
- Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March.
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