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A Linear Generalization of Stackelberg's Model

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Lafay

    (UP1 UFR06 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR Gestion & économie d'entreprise - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

We study an extension of Stackelberg's model in which many firms can produce at many different times. Demand is affine while cost is linear. In this setting, we investigate whether Stackelberg's results in a two-firm game are robust when the number of firms increases. We show that: firms may not need to anticipate further entries, leaders might earn less than in the simultaneous game and, whatever its cost and its time of entry, the firm's entry always improves welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Lafay, 2010. "A Linear Generalization of Stackelberg's Model," Post-Print hal-00826285, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00826285
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    Cited by:

    1. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2021. "Stackelberg Independence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 214-238, March.
    2. Bersani, Alberto M. & Falbo, Paolo & Mastroeni, Loretta, 2022. "Is the ETS an effective environmental policy? Undesired interaction between energy-mix, fuel-switch and electricity prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    3. Ludovic Julien & Olivier Musy & Aurélien Saïdi, 2012. "On hierarchical competition in oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(3), pages 217-237, November.
    4. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova, 2011. "Strategic behavior under partial cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 175-193, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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