Sons of Something: Taxes, Lawsuits and Local Political Control in Sixteenth Century Castile
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- Drelichman, Mauricio, 2007. "Sons of Something: Taxes, Lawsuits, and Local Political Control in Sixteenth-Century Castile," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(03), pages 608-642, September.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Drelichman, Mauricio, 2009.
"License to till: The privileges of the Spanish Mesta as a case of second-best institutions,"
Explorations in Economic History,
Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 220-240, April.
- Drelichman, Mauricio, 2006. "License to Till: The Privileges of the Spanish Mesta as a Case of Second Best Institutions," Economics working papers drelichman-06-04-24-11-33, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 03 Oct 2008.
More about this item
Keywordsrent seeking; nobility; local government; litigation; redistribution; institutions; institutional analysis; empirical method; game theory; Castile; Spain;
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2005-11-09 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-11-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-11-09 (Positive Political Economics)
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