The Transition to a Market Economy in Russia: Property Rights, Mass Privatization and Stabilization
The Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe are undergoing a historically unprecedented restructuring as they move inexorably from centrally planned economies toward market economies. This historic transition must be guided by a coherent set of stabilization policies to reduce the threat of macroeconomic collapse and the threat of inflation. As a precursor to price liberalization, private property rights must be created, distributed and credibly enforced in order to ensure that these rights can be freely traded at market prices. The creation and distribution of property rights must find a balance between the competing goals of equity on the one hand and efficient governance structures on the other. Finally, provision must be made for a social safety net, sufficiently broad to minimize the short run burden of an inevitably costly adjustment process in order to avoid a crisis of constitutional authority. A program of “Socialist Privatization” is proposed as a political means of establishing market capitalism on the basis of an equitable distribution of wealth.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eduardo Borensztein, 1991. "Proposals for Privatization in Eastern Europe," IMF Working Papers 91/36, International Monetary Fund.
- Feige, E.L., 1991. "Socialist Privatization," Papers 1a, United Nations World Employment Programme-.
- Eduardo Borensztein & Manmohan S. Kumar, 1991. "Proposals for Privatization in Eastern Europe," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 38(2), pages 300-326, June.
- Edgar L. Feige, 1991.
"Perestroika and Ruble Convertibility,"
Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 10(3), pages 631-653, Winter.
- Edgar L. Feige, 2004. "Perestroika And Ruble Convertibility," Development and Comp Systems 0404002, EconWPA.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
- Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- Ickes, B.W. & Ryterman, R., 1992. "Inter-Enterprise Arrears and Financial Underdevelopment in Russia," Papers 9-92-6, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0312001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.