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What Do Central Bankers Do? Evidence from the European Central Bank's Executive Board

Author

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  • Harald Badinger

    (Department of Economics, WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business), CESifo)

  • Volker Nitsch

    (Department of Law and Economics, Darmstadt University of Technology, CESifo)

Abstract

This paper examines how managers at the top of a public institution, central bank executives, allocate their working time. Using detailed information from personal diaries of the six members of the European Central Bank's Executive Board over a period of two years, we codify and analyze more than 3,700 reported activities and compare the results with recent findings on the time use of CEOs in the private sector. We report four additional observations. First, the daily schedule of central bankers is dominated by routine tasks; variations in economic uncertainty have, on average, no significant effect on the number of activities. Second, there are sizable differences in the scope of activities across board members. Third, the change in publication rules of diary entries from `on request' to `regular' was associated with a significant decline in reported activities. Fourth, nationality matters: Board members interact disproportionately often with fellow nationals.

Suggested Citation

  • Harald Badinger & Volker Nitsch, 2019. "What Do Central Bankers Do? Evidence from the European Central Bank's Executive Board," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp277, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp277
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Dür & Christoph Moser & Gabriele Spilker, 2020. "The political economy of the European Union," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 561-572, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Management; Time Use;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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