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Banking Fragility and Disclosure: International Evidence

  • Solomon Tadesse

    ()

Motivated by recent public policy debates on the role of market discipline in banking stability, I examine the impact of greater bank disclosure in mitigating the likelihood of systemic banking crisis. In a cross sectional study of banking systems across 49 countries in the 90s, I find that banking crises are less likely in countries with financial reporting regimes characterized by (i) comprehensive disclosure (ii) informative disclosure, (iii) timely disclosure and (iv) more stringent auditing.

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File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp748.pdf
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Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp748.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-748
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  1. Hoggarth, Glenn & Reis, Ricardo & Saporta, Victoria, 2002. "Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 825-855, May.
  2. Cull, Robert & Senbet, Lemma W. & Sorge, Marco, 2001. "Deposit insurance and financial development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2682, The World Bank.
  3. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996. "The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems," International Finance Discussion Papers 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  4. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1999. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability ? An empirical investigation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2247, The World Bank.
  6. Marcel Canoy & Machiel van Dijk & Jan Lemmen & Ruud de Mooij & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Competition and stability in banking," CPB Document 15, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  7. Ross Levine, 2003. "More on finance and growth: more finance, more growth?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 31-46.
  8. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 1997. "The Determinants of Banking Crises; Evidence From Developing and Developed Countries," IMF Working Papers 97/106, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2003. "Bank concentration and crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3041, The World Bank.
  10. John S. Jordan & Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1999. "Impact of greater bank disclosure amidst a banking crisis," Working Papers 99-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  11. Panzar, John C & Rosse, James N, 1987. "Testing for "Monopoly" Equilibrium," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 443-56, June.
  12. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr, Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2588, The World Bank.
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