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Excessive supplier pricing and high-quality foreclosure

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Abstract

This article shows that entry of a more input-efficient, but lower quality downstream producer, compared to a high-quality downstream incumbent, might be detrimental to social welfare. In particular, if the entrant is extremely efficient, a monopolist upstream supplier reacts by charging an excessive price, driving the high-quality incumbent out of the market and reducing social welfare. However, despite the entrant's low input requirement, the supplier's profit increases for all but the most efficient entrant technologies. Enabling the supplier to engage in third degree price discrimination may increase social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Obradovits, 2013. "Excessive supplier pricing and high-quality foreclosure," Vienna Economics Papers vie1303, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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