Dynamic Economic Game Theory and Asian Free Trade Agreements
The purpose of this paper is to use fairly standard game theory elements and apply them to free trade agreements (FTA) made within ASEAN countries and between ASEAN countries and outside countries and the rest of the world (ROW). The applications use some mathematics, but it is not my intent to burden unnecessarily the reader with the mathematics. My intent is to make the applications appeal to the practitioners who are directly or at least indirectly engaged in the process of making FTA’s and who are interested in a theoretical basis for FTA’s. The intent then could be described as being largely pedagogical. The main contribution of the paper is to show the structure and behavior of the backward solution method used in dynamic game theory.
|Date of creation:||2008|
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- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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