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Dynamic Economic Game Theory and Asian Free Trade Agreements

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  • James P. Gander

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to use fairly standard game theory elements and apply them to free trade agreements (FTA) made within ASEAN countries and between ASEAN countries and outside countries and the rest of the world (ROW). The applications use some mathematics, but it is not my intent to burden unnecessarily the reader with the mathematics. My intent is to make the applications appeal to the practitioners who are directly or at least indirectly engaged in the process of making FTAÂ’s and who are interested in a theoretical basis for FTAÂ’s. The intent then could be described as being largely pedagogical. The main contribution of the paper is to show the structure and behavior of the backward solution method used in dynamic game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • James P. Gander, 2008. "Dynamic Economic Game Theory and Asian Free Trade Agreements," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2008_18, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uta:papers:2008_18
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    File URL: http://economics.utah.edu/research/publications/2008_18.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard E. Baldwin, 2008. "Managing The Noodle Bowl: The Fragility Of East Asian Regionalism," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 53(03), pages 449-478.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fithra Faisal Hastiadi, 2012. "China-Japan-Korea (CJK)'s FTA Strategy towards ASEAN Countries: A Game Theoretical Approach," Working Papers in Economics and Business 201210, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia, revised Oct 2012.

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