Optimal Contract Design with Unilateral Market Option
Contrary to previous literature, we show that the assignment of authority decision matters in optimal contract design with bilateral specific self-investments. This is the case when we enlarge the set of the states of nature, to explicitly consider the event that a party's market option turns out to be binding ex-post. We show that, under this setting, simple contracts protected by specific performance remedies may generate hold-up and thus parties' incentives to under-invest. However, investment efficiency is enhanced when authority is assigned to the party with ex-post binding market option. Our results suggest a neglected rationale for vertical integration as a remedy against hold-up
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