Optimal Size and Intensity of Job Search Assistance Programs
This paper derives the welfare optimal size and intensity of job search assistance programs in a general equilibrium model where the labor market is affected by search frictions. Both instruments have a priori ambiguous fiscal implications: their direct employment stimulating effects broaden the base of the labor income tax and increase revenues, while also incurring direct costs. At optimal levels, the policy instruments trade off the positive effects on the participants against a marginal increase in taxes, which distorts employment decisions and potentially labor market tightness. We find that the higher unemployment insurance benefits, the lower is the optimal program intensity. Further, the introduction of a job search assistance program is more likely to raise welfare if it is highly effective at improving participants' job search skills, direct program costs are low and if the general level of taxation in the economy and thus the labor market participation tax are high.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Dufourstrasse 50, CH - 9000 St.Gallen|
Phone: +41 71 224 23 25
Fax: +41 71 224 31 35
Web page: http://www.seps.unisg.ch/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peter Dolton & Donal O'Neill, 2002. "The Long-Run Effects of Unemployment Monitoring and Work-Search Programs: Experimental Evidence from the United Kingdom," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 381-403, Part.
- David T. Coe & Dennis J. Snower, 1997.
"Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labor Market Reform,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(1), pages 1-35, March.
- David Coe & Dennis Snower, 1996. "Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labor Market Reform," Archive Discussion Papers 9625, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Coe, David T & Snower, Dennis J., 1997. "Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labour Market Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 1585, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1998. "A framework for analyzing the political support for active labor market policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 151-165, February.
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1995. "A Framework for Analysing the Political Support for Active Labour Market Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Saint-Paul, G., 1995. "A Framework for Analyzing the Political Support for Active Labor Market Policy," DELTA Working Papers 95-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Keuschnigg, Christian & Ribi, Evelyn, 2009. "Outsourcing, unemployment and welfare policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 168-176, June.
- Christian Keuschnigg & Evelyn Ribi, 2007. "Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare Policy," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-41, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Christian Keuschnigg & Evelyn Ribi, 2008. "Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2452, CESifo Group Munich.
- Keuschnigg, Christian & Ribi, Evelyn, 2007. "Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6605, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christian Keuschnigg & Evelyn Ribi, 2007. "Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare Policy," Working Papers 0720, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Nicola Pavoni & G. L. Violante, 2007. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318.
- Nicola Pavoni & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005. "Optimal welfare-to-work programs," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 143, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Pavoni, Nicola & Violante, Giovanni L, 2006. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 5937, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:hhs:iuiwop:429 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bruno, VAN DER LINDEN, 2005. "Equilibrium Evaluation of Active Labor Market Programmes Enhancing Matching Effectiveness," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005007, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Van der Linden, Bruno, 2005. "Equilibrium Evaluation of Active Labor Market Programmes Enhancing Matching Effectiveness," IZA Discussion Papers 1526, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Calmfors, Lars & Lang, Harald, 1995. "Macroeconomic Effects of Active Labour Market Programmes in a Union Wage-Setting Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 601-619, May.
- Fredriksson, Peter, 1999. "The political economy of public employment programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 487-504, June.
- Fredriksson, Peter, 1997. "The Political Economy of Public Employment Programs," Working Paper Series 1997:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usg:dp2009:2009-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martina Flockerzi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.