The Political Economy of Public Employment Programs
In this paper we study the consequences of endogenous active labor market policies. In particular it is assumed that all viable policies have to please the employed majority. The main objective is to seek the answer to the following question: In what sense does the political equilibrium deviate from the welfare optimum? We find that the political process yields excessive program activity under highly plausible circumstances. Thereason for this deviation from constrained efficiency is that active labor market policy inflicts costs on firms that are ignored by the employed.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||25 Jan 1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Public Economics, 1999, pages 487-504.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden|
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert J. MacCulloch, 2002.
"The Determination of Unemployment Benefits,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 404-434, Part.
- Di Tella, R. & MacCulloch, R., 1996. "The Determination of Unemployment Benefits," Economics Series Working Papers 99180, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- DiTella, Rafael & MacCulloch, Robert, 2001. "The determination of unemployment benefits," ZEI Working Papers B 04-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Diamond, Peter A., 1980. "An alternative to steady-state comparisons," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 7-9.
- Wright, Randall, 1986. "The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 377-399, December.
- Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and Real Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 676-90, September.
- P. Diamond, 1980.
"Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment and Efficiency,"
257, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter A, 1981. "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 798-812, August.
- Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
- Anders Forslund & Alan B. Krueger, 1994.
"An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy: New and Received Wisdom,"
NBER Working Papers
4802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anders Forslund & Alan B. Krueger, 1997. "An Evaluation of the Swedish Active Labor Market Policy: New and Received Wisdom," NBER Chapters, in: The Welfare State in Transition: Reforming the Swedish Model, pages 267-298 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 1-76.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1997_006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Katarina Grönvall)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.