Workers cooperation within the firm: an analysis using small and medium size firms
We investigate the determinants of teamwork and workers cooperation within the firm. Up to now the literature has almost exclusively focused on workers incentives as the main determinants for workers cooperation. We take a broader look at the firm's organizational design and analyze the impact that different aspects of it might have on cooperation. In particular, we consider the way in which the degree of decentralization of decisions and the use of complementary HRM practices (what we call the .rm.s vertical organizational design) can affect workers'collaboration with each other. We test the model's predictions on a unique dataset on Spanish small and medium size firms containing a rich set of variables that allows us to use sensible proxies for workers cooperation. We find that the decentralization of labor decisions (and to a less extent that of task planning) has a positive impact on workers cooperation. Likewise, cooperation is positively correlated to many of the HRM practices that seem to favor workers'interaction the most. We also confirm the previous finding that collaborative efforts respond positively to pay incentives, and particularly, to group or company incentives.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Avda. de la Universitat,1 - 43204 Reus (Tarragona)|
Phone: 977 75 98 00
Fax: 977 75 98 10
Web page: http://www.urv.cat
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-580, June.
- Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-636, May.
- Massimo G. Colombo & Marco Delmastro, 2004. "Delegation of Authority In Business Organizations: An Empirical Test," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 53-80, 03.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Drago, Robert & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1988. "Individual versus group piece rates under team technologies," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-10, March.
- Drago, Robert & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1991. "Competition and cooperation in the workplace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 347-364, May.
- Alfonso Miranda & Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, 2006. "Maximum likelihood estimation of endogenous switching and sample selection models for binary, ordinal, and count variables," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 6(3), pages 285-308, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/179606. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ariadna Casals)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.