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Information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values

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Abstract

We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values. A trade of one asset (or lack thereof) can provide information about the value of other assets. The information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium. We show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset values is sufficiently high. The equilibria are ranked in terms of both trade volume and efficiency. We study the implications for policies that target market transparency as well as the market's ability to aggregate information. Total welfare is higher in any equilibrium of a fully transparent market than in a fully opaque one. However, both welfare and trading activity can decrease in the degree of market transparency. If traders have asymmetric access to transaction data, transparency levels the playing field, reduces the rents of more informed traders, but may also reduce total welfare. Moreover, even in a fully transparent market, information is not necessarily aggregated as the number of informed traders becomes arbitrarily large.

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  • Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2015. "Information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values," Economics Working Papers 1482, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1482
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    Cited by:

    1. Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Credit default swaps and market information," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    2. Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1164, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Gündüz, Yalin & Ottonello, Giorgio & Pelizzon, Loriana & Schneider, Michael & Subrahmanyam, Marti G., 2018. "Lighting up the dark: Liquidity in the German corporate bond market," SAFE Working Paper Series 230, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    4. Asriyan, Vladimir & Fuchs, William & Green, Brett, 2021. "Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    5. Cereda, Fábio & Chague, Fernando & De-Losso, Rodrigo & Genaro, Alan & Giovannetti, Bruno, 2022. "Price transparency in OTC equity lending markets: Evidence from a loan fee benchmark," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 569-592.
    6. Fuchs, William & Öry, Aniko & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2016. "Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    7. Eeva Mauring, 2020. "Informational Cycles in Search Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 170-192, November.
    8. Eeva Mauring, 2020. "Informational Cycles in Search Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 170-192, November.
    9. Anton Tsoy, 2016. "Liquidity and Prices in Decentralized Markets with Almost Public Information," 2016 Meeting Papers 8, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Braz Camargo & Kyungmin Kim & Benjamin Lester, 2016. "Information Spillovers, Gains from Trade, and Interventions in Frozen Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(5), pages 1291-1329.
    11. Vladimir Asriyan, 2017. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection," 2017 Meeting Papers 988, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Zhou, Shengjie & Ye, Qing, 2023. "Margin trading and spillover effects: Evidence from the Chinese stock markets," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    13. Tsoy, Anton, 2018. "Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    14. Pintér, Gábor & Wang, Chaojun & Zou, Junyuan, 2022. "Information chasing versus adverse selection," Bank of England working papers 971, Bank of England.
    15. Jordan Martel & Kenneth Mirkin & Brian Waters, 2022. "Learning by Owning in a Lemons Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1737-1785, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; information spillovers; market transparency; liquidity.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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