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Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values

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  • Vladimir Asriyan
  • William Fuchs
  • Brett Green

Abstract

We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated assets owned by privately informed sellers. In the model, a trade of one asset can provide information about the value of other assets. Importantly, the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined. We show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when assets are sufficiently correlated. The equilibria are ranked in terms of both trade volume and efficiency. The model has implications for policies targeting post-trade transparency. We show that introducing post-trade transparency can increase or decrease welfare and trading volume depending on the asset correlation, equilibrium being played, and the composition of market participants.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2017. "Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 2007-2040, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:7:p:2007-40
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151714
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cereda, Fábio & Chague, Fernando & De-Losso, Rodrigo & Genaro, Alan & Giovannetti, Bruno, 2022. "Price transparency in OTC equity lending markets: Evidence from a loan fee benchmark," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 569-592.
    2. Eeva Mauring, 2020. "Informational Cycles in Search Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 170-192, November.
    3. Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Credit default swaps and market information," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    4. Vladimir Asriyan, 2017. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection," 2017 Meeting Papers 988, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Zhou, Shengjie & Ye, Qing, 2023. "Margin trading and spillover effects: Evidence from the Chinese stock markets," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    6. Gündüz, Yalin & Ottonello, Giorgio & Pelizzon, Loriana & Schneider, Michael & Subrahmanyam, Marti G., 2018. "Lighting up the dark: Liquidity in the German corporate bond market," SAFE Working Paper Series 230, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    7. Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers 1712, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2021.
    8. Asriyan, Vladimir & Fuchs, William & Green, Brett, 2021. "Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Tsoy, Anton, 2018. "Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    10. Pintér, Gábor & Wang, Chaojun & Zou, Junyuan, 2022. "Information chasing versus adverse selection," Bank of England working papers 971, Bank of England.
    11. Fuchs, William & Öry, Aniko & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2016. "Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    12. Eeva Mauring, 2020. "Informational Cycles in Search Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 170-192, November.
    13. Anton Tsoy, 2016. "Liquidity and Prices in Decentralized Markets with Almost Public Information," 2016 Meeting Papers 8, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Braz Camargo & Kyungmin Kim & Benjamin Lester, 2016. "Information Spillovers, Gains from Trade, and Interventions in Frozen Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(5), pages 1291-1329.
    15. Jordan Martel & Kenneth Mirkin & Brian Waters, 2022. "Learning by Owning in a Lemons Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1737-1785, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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