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Generative AI: A Double-Edged Sword for Western Democracy

Author

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  • Ritzen, Jo

    (Mt Economic Research Inst on Innov/Techn, RS: GSBE MGSoG, RS: UNU-MERIT Theme 3)

Abstract

The advent of generative artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked a critical debate: will it fortify democratic institutions or accelerate their decline? This paper evaluates AI’s dual role as both a potential guardian and disruptor of democracy in the Western hemisphere. At the centre of analysis stands the traditional economic model of human decision making, with information asymmetry. Personalized advertising, based on clicks, recorded purchase- and social media behaviour are powerful sales-boosters. Without being held to ethical boundaries, generative AI will increase rather than reduce the asymmetries in markets. Translating the economic model to voting behaviour the same asymmetry appears. Drawing on case studies, empirical research, and policy analyses, the paper explores how AI’s capabilities—from spreading disinformation to enhancing civic engagement—shape democratic resilience. The discussion emphasizes the urgent need for balanced governance to harness AI’s benefits while mitigating its risks. By synthesizing insights from recent elections, regulatory frameworks, and socio-political trends, this paper argues that proactive, multi-sectoral collaboration is essential to ensure AI serves as a bulwark rather than a threat to democratic values.

Suggested Citation

  • Ritzen, Jo, 2025. "Generative AI: A Double-Edged Sword for Western Democracy," MERIT Working Papers 2025-021, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:unumer:2025021
    DOI: 10.53330/BXZF3714
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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